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Abstract
We examine how diﬀerent unionisation structures and the spillovers of
R&D activities aﬀect R&D investments and ﬁr m s ’i n c e n t i v e st of o r maR e -
search Joint Venture. We ﬁnd that whenever ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively,
an industry union increases R&D investments, if industry speciﬁc spillovers
are low. In case of a Research Joint Venture, investments are always
higher under ﬁrm-level unions. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ incentives to
form a Research Joint Venture are stronger when they face an industry
union, if spillovers are low. Rigidities in the labour market, such as high
unemployment beneﬁts or/and a central union, have negative eﬀects on
employment, output and proﬁts and hinder the diﬀusion of the eﬃciency
created by a RJV to consumers and employees. Integrated labour market
and R&D policies are also discussed.
JEL classiﬁcation: J51; L13; O31
Keywords: Trade Unions; Oligopoly; Process Innovations
1I n t r o d u c t i o n 1
It is well established that innovations in the production process aﬀect ﬁrms’
proﬁts, employment and wages. Due to the eﬀects of process innovations on em-
ployees, labour market institutions, and especially labour unions, are amongst
the key determinants of ﬁrms’ strategies for process innovations’ R&D invest-
ments. In this ﬁeld, theoretical and empirical work is mixed (for a survey, see
∗E-mail addresses: manasakis@stud.soc.uoc.gr (Manasakis), petrakis@econ.soc.uoc.gr (Pe-
trakis)
1We wish to thank participants at the ASSET meeting 2004 in Barcelona and the audience
of presentations of this paper at the working seminars of the University of Crete and the
University of Ioannina.
1Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003). Hirsch (2004) underlines that the ex-
isting empirical evidence does not allow us to establish (or reject) causal union
eﬀects and their magnitudes. Thus, the argument for the “two faces of union-
ism”, ﬁrst mentioned by Freeman and Medoﬀ (1984), remains robust, even now,
twenty years later.2
The formal debate for the eﬀects of unions on ﬁrms’ investments for pro-
ductivity enhancing innovations has its origins on the seminal paper of Grout
(1984).3 The conventional "rent-extracting" argument indicates that as far as
unions raise wages and other labour costs, the stronger the bargaining power of
unions, the higher the rents that they capture. Thus, unions will reduce ﬁrms’
proﬁts and returns on R&D investments. Firms know this ex ante and as a
result they invest low amounts (underinvest) in R&D for process innovations.4
In the recent literature, the rent-extracting potential of unions has been for-
malized in "institutional" terms, rather than in terms of bargaining power distri-
bution between ﬁrms and unions. The institutional approach indicates that the
more centralised the collective bargaining system, the weaker the competition
and the stronger the coordination between unions. Thus, a centralised system
of collective bargaining enables unions to demand higher wages and strengthens
their rent-extracting potential. It should be mentioned that this approach in-
corporates the diﬀerences in the level where wages are set across industries and
countries.5 Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre (2002) show that for a small market
size, a labour-saving process innovation is more likely to be adopted by a ﬁrm in
the presence of a centralised union -compared with a decentralised one- a result
which contradicts also with the conventional argument. In the same lines, Hau-
cap and Wey (2004), in a framework where two ﬁrms engage in a patent race
2While the monopoly ‘face’ of unions focuses on their wage demands and thus on their
negative eﬀects, the second ‘face’ focuses on the role of unions as an eﬃciency-enhancing
institution due to its role in smoothening industrial relations.
3In a "one ﬁrm-one union" framework, Grout (1984) shows that in the absence of legally
binding contracts, once the ﬁrm has invested in a particular level of capital, the union will
have incentives to demand a higher wage in order to extract a share of rents and this drives
to underinvestment.
4Early theoretical work on the relationship between unionisation and innovative activity
had focused on the eﬀects of ﬁrm-level unions’ bargaining power has on ﬁrms’ incentives
to invest for labour savings innovations. Tauman and Weiss (1987), incorporating strategic
interaction between ﬁrms that undertake R&D projects in a tournament R&D setup, show
that the unionised duopolist, compared with the nonunionised one, has a greater incentive to
adopt the new technology which drives to lower labour requirements. Ulph and Ulph (1994,
1998) consider a Cournot duopoly, where two ﬁrms, that are in a race for a labour saving
process innovation, bargain with two ﬁrm-level unions over employment and wages ("Eﬃcient
Bargaining"). They prove that a stronger risk-averse union (a union that weights employment
more than wages in the utility function) encourages its ﬁrm to increase investment in order
to win the patent race. The result will be a higher market share which will make both the
union and the ﬁrm better oﬀ.
5Evidence by Flanagan (1999) indicates that in the U.S.A., Canada, Japan and U.K.,
bargaining over wages takes place at the level of ﬁrm. In Europe, wage negotiations are often
conducted at various levels: In Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, France and Portugal, bargaining
takes place at the sector-level. In Germany and the Scandinavian countries, bargaining takes
place at both the national and the sector-level and at all three levels (national-, sector-, and
ﬁrm-level) in Belgium and Greece.
2for a labour-saving process innovation, show that innovation incentives are not
monotone in the degree of centralisation of wage-bargaining: Innovation incen-
tives are the largest when an industry union sets a uniform wage, but incentives
under a central union that coordinates, through wage discrimination, the wage
demands of two ﬁrm-level unions are weaker than incentives under perfectly
decentralised ﬁrm-level bargaining.6
However, in the bulk of the literature, two well established determinants of
amounts invested in R&D have not been taken into account: The ﬁrst is the
spillover eﬀect of R&D activities and the second is the organizational form of
R&D investments and whether ﬁrms invest strategically or cooperatively, by
forming a Research Joint Venture (RJV hereafter).7 In their seminal paper, d’
Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) deﬁne that ‘R&D externalities or spillovers
imply that some beneﬁts of each ﬁrm’s R&D ﬂow without compensation to other
ﬁrms and this may cause free-riding behaviour and underinvestment problems’.
Thus, ﬁrms may form a RJV in order to internalize spillovers and to avoid
free-riding. Hagedoorn et al. (2000) and Caloghirou et al. (2003), surveying
a great series of theoretical and empirical papers, conclude on some consistent
ﬁndings according to the advantages of RJVs: Internalizing R&D spillovers,
cost sharing, reducing R&D duplication, access to complementary resources
and skills, exploiting economies of scale and scope, distributing the investment
risk to more investors and promoting technical standards are strong incentives
for R&D cooperation.8
The purpose of this paper is precisely to incorporate the spillover eﬀects
and the RJV potential in the literature for the union eﬀects on process inno-
vations R&D investments. In this framework, we address the following ques-
tions: Firstly, "how does the interaction between R&D spillovers and the rent-
extracting of unions aﬀect ﬁrms’ amounts invested in cases of non-cooperative
6Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003), surveying the bulk of the empirical literature in the
ﬁeld, conclude on consistently strong and negative impacts of unions on R&D expenditures for
t h ec a s eo fN o r t hA m e r i c au n l i k ef o rt h ec a s eo fE u r o p e ,w h e r en os a f ep a t t e r nc a nb er e a c h e d .
A c c o r d i n gt ot h ee ﬀects of unions on innovations, U.S. studies ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative eﬀects,
while European studies ﬁnd insigniﬁcant, but in summary, the ﬁndings are even less clear due
to very limited number of papers. Thus, the authors conclude that no safe pattern, according
to the causal eﬀects of unions, can be reached.
7Although R&D spillovers have not been taken into account in any of the above formal
models, empirical ﬁndings suggest that spillovers aﬀect competitors’ average cost (Bernstein
and Nadiri, 1989), labour productivity and total factor productivity (Coe and Helpman, 1995;
Frantzen, 2000). Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) ﬁnd a positive correlation between partic-
ipation, labour productivity and price-cost margin for European ﬁrms participating in RJVs,
sponsored under the EUREKA project during 1992-1996.
8Hagedoorn and van Kranenburg (2003) establish the growing trends of RJVs as an R&D
organizational form. Caloghirou et al. (2003), exploring the existing databases (MERIT-
CATI, NCRA-RJV, CORE, STEP TO RJV), demonstrate that the number of new partner-
ships set up annually increased from about 30—40 in the early seventies to 100—200 in the late
seventies. Starting from around 200 per year, the number of new partnerships announced
every year reached around 600 or more in the eighties and nineties. Especially for the case of
the E.U., Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002) mention that 1031 RJVs were sponsored under
the EUREKA project over the 1985—1996 period and 3874 RJVs were ﬁnanced under the 3rd
and 4th Framework Programs for Science and Technology (FPST) over the 1992—1996 period.
3and cooperative R&D investments?" and secondly, "how does the level of wage-
setting aﬀect ﬁrms’ incentives to move from a strategic structure of R&D in-
vestments towards a RJV?"
In order to answer these questions, we consider a homogeneous good Cournot
duopoly where symmetric ﬁr m si n v e s ti nR & Df o rc o s tr e d u c i n gp r o c e s si n n o -
vations. Firms can invest either non-cooperatively, or by forming a RJV, while
R&D activities exhibit spillovers. In the spirit of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) and Kamien et al. (1992), spillovers are considered to be industry speciﬁc
and exogenous. In the labour market, workers are organized either in ﬁrm-level
unions or in a central union and the bargaining between ﬁrms and union(s) is
carried out over wage.9
Our results indicate that the eﬀect of the union structure, and the corre-
sponding rent-extracting potential, on R&D investments, depends on whether
spillovers lead to free-riding or being internalized. In case of non-cooperative
investments, where spillovers lead to free-riding, a central union may lead to
investment increases, if free-riding is weak. We argue that when competition is
ﬁerce, in terms that ﬁrms behave strategically in both R&D and output stages,
it is the combination of weak free-riding, that favours, and single union’s strong
pressure, that forces, ﬁrms to increase R&D investments. This result contradicts
with the hold-up argument which predicts that the stronger rent-extracting by a
central union leads to underinvestment per se. In case of a RJV, where spillovers
are internalized, investments are higher under ﬁrm-level unions. In this case,
competition is less ﬁerce. Firms invest cooperatively in the R&D stage, they
internalize spillovers and avoid free-riding. Subsequently, it is the level where
wages are set that mainly drives investments. Although a central union may
favour R&D investments in case of non-cooperation, we ﬁnd that it always re-
duces employment, output and proﬁts under non-cooperative and cooperative
R&D investments as well. Additionally, rigidities in the labour market, such
as high unemployment beneﬁts, increase wages and hinder R&D investments,
employment and output.
According to ﬁrms’ incentives to form a RJV, we prove that these are
stronger when they face an industry union, if internalized spillovers through
the RJV are low. Whenever internalized spillovers are low, a central union
never captures a higher wage under the RJV, compared with wage in case of
non-cooperating investments, while ﬁrm-level unions may capture higher wages.
9In the literature for productivity enhancing process innovations, innovations are consid-
ered to be either ‘input-saving’ or ‘cost-reducing’. The literature on the relationship between
unionisation and innovative activity has focused on the ‘labour-saving’ process innovations
solely. Firms undertake R&D investments in order to reduce their labour requirement, and
the corresponding labour cost, per unit of output. In this case, the unit cost reduces and the
productivity enhances through the reduction of labour requirement per unit of output. We
rather examine the case of ‘cost-reducing’ process innovations, assuming that ﬁrms engage in
R&D investments in order to reduce their unit cost of transformating labour to the ﬁnal good.
In this case, it is the reduction of the transformation cost per unit of output that reduces the
unit cost and enhances the productivity. However, the above types of process innovations can
be considered as equivalent, in terms that both lead to unit cost reduction and productivity
enhancement, although the paths followed diﬀer.
4Therefore, the eﬃciency of the RJV, as a weapon to overcome rent-extracting is
higher if internalized spillovers are low. As far as a central union may favour the
formation of a RJV more than ﬁrm-level unions do, our argument goes against
the conventional argument for the negative eﬀects of unions per se. We fur-
ther conclude that although a RJV, compared with non-cooperation, performs
better in terms of R&D investments, wages, employment and output, if internal-
ized spillovers exceed a critical rate, the intense ‘rationally myopic’ behaviour
(Hirsch, 2004) of a central union and its higher wage demands deter employ-
ment and output increases and subsequently hinder investments, employment
and output increases and subsequently hinder the diﬀusion of the eﬃciency
created by a RJV to consumers and employees.
We also apply our model for the case of Bertrand competition and for the case
where the rent-extracting potential of unions is modelled by the combination
of the institutional level where wages are set and the distribution of bargaining
power between ﬁrms and unions. Our results remain robust and therefore we
contribute to the relevant literature as we prove that it is the institutional level of
wage-bargaining, rather than the distribution of bargaining power, that mainly
drives the results.
Our welfare analysis reveals a consistent depression in consumers surplus
and social welfare in case of a centralised system of wage-setting, for both or-
ganizational forms of R&D activities. In addition, although a RJV is always
proﬁtable for ﬁrms, it does not always lead to enhanced social welfare. The
economic rationale behind this result lays in deterring eﬀects of a central union
on the diﬀusion of the eﬃciency created by a RJV to consumers and employees.
We also mention the diﬃculties for the alignment between ﬁrms’ and regulators’
preferences, caused by a centralised system of bargaining, a novel argument in
the literature as well. Our policy implications suggest an integrated labour mar-
ket and R&D policies framework. Extending antitrust rules to labour markets,
reducing unemployment beneﬁts and encouraging RJVs, can be an integrated
framework to improve market performance and consumers surplus as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present the
model. In section 3, we analyze the case of non-cooperative R&D investments,
for ﬁrm-level unions and an industry-wide union. In section 4, we examine the
case of a RJV for both levels of unionisation as well. In section 5, we analyze
ﬁrms’ incentives to form a RJV, and in section 6, we discuss some extensions
of our model. In section 7 we carry out the welfare analysis and suggest policy
implications. Finally, section 8 oﬀers the conclusion of this paper.
2 The model
2.1 The product market
We consider a homogeneous goods Cournot duopoly with ﬁrms i,j =1 ,2,i6= j
and a linear inverse demand function, given by P (Q)=a−Q,w h e r eq1+q2 = Q
is aggregate output. Firms operate under constant returns to scale and we
5normalize output to employment, using a production function of the form qi =
Li.F i r mi requires Li units of labour for qi units of the ﬁnal good. Employees
are identically skilled and we let the wage for employees in ﬁrm i to be wi.
We also assume that the marginal cost of transformating labour into the ﬁnal
good is c.F i r mi can invest in R&D for cost-reducing process innovations. The
overall marginal cost is given by wi+c−xi−δxj. xi is the cost reduction due to
ﬁrm i’s R&D investment, while xj is the beneﬁts that leak from ﬁrm j to ﬁrm i
without compensation, due to the spillovers of R&D activities. δ is the spillover
rate, indicating the R&D externalities, with 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1.T h ec o s to fR & Di sx2
i,
reﬂecting the existence of diminishing returns to R&D expenditures. Thus, ﬁrm
i has a total cost function, Ci =( wi + c − xi − δxj)Li − x2
i,i,j=1 ,2,i6= j.
We consider that in this industry, R&D can be carried out under two alter-
native organizational forms:
I. Non-cooperatively, where duopolists carry out their R&D activities strate-
gically. Formally speaking, ﬁrms act non-cooperatively in both R&D and output
stages.
I I .C o o p e r a t i v e l y ,w h e r et h eﬁrms form a RJV and enjoy the common R&D
output. In this case, ﬁrms cooperate in order to maximize their joint proﬁts in
the R&D stage, although remaining competitors in the output stage.10
2.2 The labour market
We consider that employees are organized either in two ﬁrm-level unions (De-
centralised regime, denoted by D), which are identical and endowed with the
same bargaining power during negotiations with ﬁrms, or in one industry union
(Centralised regime, denoted by C). The structure of the labour market is
assumed to be exogenously given. We further consider that unions act as rent-
maximizers. Unions care about the ‘real wage surplus’ of their members, the
diﬀerence between wi, the real wage bill in the unionised sector, and w0,t h e
workers’ outside option.11 In case of two ﬁrm-level unions, the utility function
for the union in ﬁrm i is Ui (wi,L i)=( wi − w0)Li,w h i l e ,i nc a s ew h e r eac e n -
tral union demands a uniform wage wi = wj = w, its utility function becomes
U (w,Li,L j)=( w − w0)(Li + Lj).12 M o r e o v e r ,w ea d o p tt h ef o l l o w i n gv e r -
10In some cases in the RJV literature it is assumed that, prior to the formation of a RJV
spillovers are δ<1, while the RJV leads to δ =1 . Following d’ Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988), we rather consider that pre-RJV spillovers and post-RJV spillovers are equal and
industry speciﬁc.
11In the trade unions literature, w0 is typically treated to be a weighted average of the
c o m p e t i t i v ew a g ea n dt h eu n e m p l o y m e n tb e n e ﬃt, the weights being the probabilities to ﬁnd
or not a job in the competitive sector. In our model, however, w0 can be captured by the
amount of the unemployment beneﬁt, set by a regulator. Therefore, w0 can be a labour
market policy instrument.
12We believe that these unionisation structures incorporate not only the wide variations
in the organization of trade unions across diﬀerent countries and industries, mentioned by
Flanagan (1999) but also the varieties in the level of bargaining across countries with the
most RJV active ﬁrms. The decentralized system of wage-setting ﬁts very well with the
case of the U.S.A., U.K. and Japan, world wide leaders in cooperative R&D partnerships
(see Caloghirou et al., 2003), while the centralized system ﬁts well with collective bargaining
6sion of the Right-to-Manage bargaining model: The union(s) set(s) the wage(s),
while ﬁrms retain the right to set employment Li and quantities qi of the ﬁnal
good.13 14
2.3 The sequence of decisions
To study how the interaction between the institutional level of wage-setting
and R&D spillovers aﬀect ﬁrms’ investments in R&D for cost-reducing process
innovations and incentives to form a RJV, we consider a four stage game with
the following timing:
Stage 1: Firms decide simultaneously, whether to cooperate (c) by forming
a RJV or to invest non-cooperatively (nc) in R&D.
Stage 2: Firms invest in R&D.
Stage 3: Unions set wages, either at the level of ﬁrm (D) or at the level of
industry (C).
Stage 4: Firms set quantities.
We ﬁrstly consider that ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively, for every level of
wage-setting, e.g. through a strict antitrust law enforcement that forbids RJVs.
Then, we consider that ﬁrms invest cooperatively, by forming a RJV. Finally,
we endogenize ﬁrms’ decision to cooperate or not and therefore, we examine
whether ﬁrms have incentives to form a RJV, for every structure of the labour
market. We solve the game using Backwards Induction, in order to deﬁne the
Subgame Nash Perfect Equilibrium (SPNE).
3 Non-cooperative R&D investments15
3.1 The case of ﬁrm-level unions
We begin our analysis by considering the case where ﬁrms invest non-cooperatively
(denoted by nc) in R&D for cost-reducing innovations. Regardless the level
systems in countries (e.g. Italy, Germany, France and Belgium) with the higher participation
in RJVs across the European Union (see Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002).
13Following Haucap and Wey (2004), we regard that unions unilaterally set wages. Although
in real life the wage rate and (possibly) the employment level is determined via ﬁrm-union
negotiations, it is a regular assumption in the “union-oligopoly bargaining” literature that
the union has all the power in wage negotiations, while the ﬁrm has all the power to set the
employment level (see Petrakis and Vlassis, 2004 and the references therein). In section 6.1 we
consider the general version of the Right to Manage model, where ﬁrms do have bargaining
power over employment, and we conﬁrm the robustness of the qualitative results obtained
under monopoly-unions.
14Even if union(s) have a utalitarian-type objective (Oswald, 1982), Ui (wi,L i)=
(wi − w0)ϕ Li with ϕ ∈ (0,1] being the elasticity of substitution between wage level and
employment of the union, qualitatively similar results can be obtained.
15As a benchmark for later comparison, we consider the case of a perfectly competitive
labour market, where employees earn the wage paid in the competitive sector of the economy,
wi = wj = w0. Similarly, in this case we regard the absence of labour unions, case (N).I n
this benchmark case, we ﬁnd that a RJV increases investments if δ>0.5, while it is always
proﬁtable for ﬁrms. A detailed analysis is available from the authors on request.
7where wages are set, in the last stage of the game, given R&D investments and
wages, each ﬁrm i sets production level in order to maximize proﬁts given by:
Πi (Li,L j,w i,x i,x j,δ)=( a − Li − Lj − wi − c + xi + δxj)Li − x2
i (1)







[(a − c) − 2wi + wj + xi (2 − δ)+xj (2δ − 1)] (2)
An increase in wi reduces q∗
i and moreover, an increase in wj increases q∗
i
through the reduction of q∗
j.F i r mi’s output and employment increase not only
with i’s R&D investment but with j’s as well, indicating the positive spillover
eﬀect of R&D activities and implying the beneﬁts of j’s R&D eﬀorts on i’s
output, but ﬁrm i’s R&D investment has always larger impact on its own output
than j’s R&D impact has, as 2−δ ≥ 2δ −1,f o r0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, always holds. In the
case of perfect spillovers (δ =1 ,e . g .ﬁrms share the same R&D laboratory), i’s
and j’s R&D investments have equal impact on each ﬁrm’s output.
Given q∗
i and q∗
j and assuming that wages are set at the level of ﬁrm (D
structure), in the third stage, ﬁrm-level unions set wages simultaneously and






(wi − w0)[(a − c) − 2wi + wj + xi (2 − δ)+xj (2δ − 1)] (3)
Union i’s utility increases with ﬁrm i’s and ﬁrm j’s R&D investment. From




[5(a − c +2 w0)+xi (7 − 2δ)+xj (7δ − 2)] (4)
7 − 2δ ≥ 7δ − 2 always holds and therefore, ﬁrm i’s R&D investment has
always larger impact -than j’s- on union i’s wage.
In the second stage of the game, ﬁrms set simultaneously their R&D invest-









Solving eq. (5), the unique and symmetric solution for the optimal non-
cooperative R&D investment levels in equilibrium is:
x∗
i =
(28 − 8δ)(a − c − w0)
377 − 20δ +8 δ
2 (6)
16We consider that c ≤ a.
17In order to ensure that employees’ in ﬁrm i wage has a positive eﬀect on their utility, we
regard that (a − c) − 2wi > 0 ⇒ 2wi < 1
2 (a − c)
8Using (2), (4), (5) and (6) we ﬁnd that if ﬁrms do not cooperate (nc) in
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242 − 20δ +8 δ
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7316 + 448δ − 64δ
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(a − c − w0)
2
¡
377 − 20δ +8 δ
2¢2 (10)
3.2 The case of one industry union
Let us now examine the case where a uniform wage is determined at the level of







[(a − c) − w + xi (2 − δ)+xj (2δ − 1)] (11)





(w − w0)[2(a − c) − 2w +( xi + xj)(1+δ)] (12)




[2(a − c − w0)+( xi + xj)(1+δ)] (13)
The wage depends positively not only on ﬁrm i’s amount invested in R&D
but also on ﬁrm j’s, due to the spillover eﬀects of R&D activities.
In the second stage of the game ﬁrms set simultaneously their R&D invest-









and the optimal non-cooperative R&D investment for ﬁrm i is:
x∗
i =
(7 − 5δ)(a − c − w0)
65 − 2δ +5 δ
2 (15)
18In order to ensure that uniform wage has a positive eﬀect on employees utility, we regard
that 2(a − c) − 2w>0 ⇒ w<a− c
9Using (11), (13), (14) and (15) we ﬁnd that when ﬁrms do not cooperate (nc)
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65 − 2δ +5 δ
2¢2 (19)
For the case of non-cooperative R&D investments, comparing results under
a decentralised system of wage-setting (D), with results under a central union
(C), we state the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (i) Total R&D investments in the industry are higher under
ac e n t r a l i s e ds y s t e mo fw a g e - s e t t i n g ,c o m p a r e dw i t ht h ed e c e n t r a l i s e do n e ,i f
spillovers are low (δ<0.55). (ii) Firms’ proﬁts and employment (wages) are
always higher (lower) under a decentralised system of wage-setting, compared
w i t hac e n t r a l i s e do n e .
According to the total R&D investments, the intuition behind our result goes
as follows: When ﬁrms invest in R&D non-cooperatively, investments depend
on the following determinants: Free-riding and unions’ rent-extracting. In case
of no free-riding (δ =0 ) , investments under a central union are always higher
than investments under ﬁrm-level unions, in contrast to the hold-up argument.





,i t sc o m -
parative stronger pressure increases R&D investments, rather than to decrease
them. As free-riding arises, (δ>0),o n l yi fi ti sw e a k(δ<0.55) the single
union’s pressure dominates the negative eﬀect of free-riding and XC >X D
holds. We argue that when competition is ﬁerce, in terms that ﬁrms behave
strategically in both R&D and output stages, the central union’s pressure, in-
creases R&D investments, if free-riding is weak. It is the combination of low
spillovers, that favour, and central union’s strong pressure, that forces, ﬁrms to
increase R&D investments. This result contradicts with the conventional argu-
ment which indicates that the stronger the rent-extracting of unions, the lower
the amounts that ﬁrms invest per se.
According to wages, employment, output and proﬁts the intuition goes as
follows: Firms invest in R&D and as a result the overall marginal cost falls.
The price of the ﬁnal good decreases, demand for the ﬁnal good increases and
demand for labour increases too. As the demand for labour increases, unions
10extract rents through demanding higher wages. A central union extracts more






. The lower the intraunion
competition, the stronger the hold-up, the higher the wages that employees






and ﬁrms’ proﬁts. This is
the rational why wages are always higher under a centralised system of wage-






. Note that, although
a central union may favour R&D investments, it always reduces employment,
output and proﬁts. Additionally, qualitative analysis of the results shows that
rigidities in the labour market, such as high unemployment beneﬁts, increase
wages and hinder R&D investments, employment and output, as far as dWnc
dw0 >
0, dXnc
dw0 < 0 and dLnc
dw0 < 0 always hold, regardless the level where wages are set.
Our results are in line with the empirical ﬁndings, according to which, process
innovations lead generally to wage and employment increases (Chennells and
Van Reenen, 2002).
In ﬁgures 1a and 1b, we plot our results for ﬁrm-level proﬁts and total R&D
investment in the industry.19 We observe that regarding as a benchmark the
case of a perfectly competitive labour market and taking into account unions’
rent-extracting in an imperfectly competitive labour market, ﬁrm i’s proﬁts and
total R&D investments decrease, which is in line with the "hold-up" argument.
But, according to investments, we proved that this argument does not holds per
se, because if δ<0.55, investments are higher under a centralised system of
wage-setting, compared with a decentralised one.
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19We divide equations that correspond to industry-wide R&D investments with (a − c − w0)
and equations that correspond to ﬁrm-level proﬁts with (a − c − w0)2.
114 Cooperative R&D investments
4.1 The case of ﬁrm-level unions
In this section, we study the case where ﬁrms invest cooperatively (denoted by
c) in R&D. In the present case, ﬁrms avoid free-riding, as far as spillovers are
internalized and as a result, the amounts invested in R&D and ﬁrms’ proﬁts
are aﬀected positively. However, unions’ rent-extracting remains a determinant
that discourages ﬁrms to invest in R&D.
Regardless the institutional level where wages are set, in the last stage of
the game, ﬁrms 1 and 2 compete in a Cournot fashion in the product market.
Output and employment are given by eq. (2).
We ﬁrstly consider the case where wages are set at the level of ﬁrms (struc-
ture D). Given q∗
i and q∗
j, ﬁrm-level unions set wages simultaneously and non-
cooperatively so as to maximize their rents. Firm-level wages are given by eq.
(4).
In the second stage of the game ﬁrms set cooperatively their R&D invest-















The solution of ﬁrst order conditions of eq. (20) gives symmetric R&D
investments in case of a RJV in equilibrium:
x∗
i =
(4 + 4δ)(a − c − w0)
77 − 8δ − 4δ
2 (21)
Using (2), (4), (20) and (21) we ﬁnd that when ﬁrms invest cooperatively
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4(a − c − w0)
2
77 − 8δ − 4δ
2 (25)
124.2 The case of one industry union
Considering a uniform wage, determined at the level of industry (C structure),
employment and output are given by eq. (11).
In the third stage of the game, the central union maximizes the utility func-
tion, given by eq. (12), by setting the uniform wage given by eq. (13).
Finally, in the second stage of the game ﬁrms decide upon their R&D in-





144 [2(a − c − w0)+xi (7δ − 5) + xj (7 − 5δ)]
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The optimal ﬁrm i’s R&D investment in case of a RJV is given by:
x∗
i =
(1 + δ)(a − c − w0)
35 − 2δ − δ
2 (27)
Using (11), (13), (26) and (27) we ﬁnd that when ﬁrms invest cooperatively
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(a − c − w0)
2
35 − 2δ + δ
2 (31)
For the case of cooperative R&D investments, comparing results under a
decentralised system of wage-setting (D), with results under a central union
(C), we state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Total R&D investments, ﬁrms’ proﬁts and employment (wages)
are always higher (lower) under a decentralised system of wage-setting, compared
w i t hac e n t r a l i s e do n e .
According to the R&D investments, in case of a RJV, ﬁrms’ competition
is less ﬁerce (compared with the case of non-cooperative investments). Firms
invest cooperatively, so as to maximize their joint proﬁts and as a result they














, in line with the hold-up argument. Therefore, in
13t h i sc a s e ,i ti st h el e v e lw h e r ew a g e sa r es e tt h a td r i v e sR & Di n v e s t m e n t sa n d
a central union leads to underinvestment always. In case of non-cooperative
investments, it is the coexistence of free-riding and rent-extracting that drives
ﬁrms’ investments, while under a RJV, it is only the rent extracting, as far as
ﬁrms internalize spillovers.
According to wages, employment, output and proﬁts, the intuition behind
the result goes exactly as in the case of non-cooperative R&D and thus it is
omitted as it replicates the same procedure seen in Proposition 1. Note that the
negative eﬀects of a central union on employment, output and proﬁts, found for
the case of non-cooperation, hold for the case of a RJV as well, and that high
unemployment beneﬁts deter R&D investments, employment and output too.
In ﬁgures 2a and 2b, we plot ﬁrm-level proﬁts and total R&D investments for
t h ec a s eo faR J V .
Let us now try to unify our results according to the eﬀects of the diﬀerent lev-
els of unionisation. We found that the eﬀect of union level on R&D investments
depends on whether spillovers are internalized or lead to free-riding. This result
underlines the critical role of the interaction between the level where wages are
set and the spillovers of R&D activities, not mentioned in the literature up to
date, and goes against the conventional argument which predicts negative eﬀects
of unions per se. Although a central union may favour non-cooperative R&D
investments, we ﬁnd that it always reduces employment, output and proﬁts for
both non-cooperative and cooperative R&D investments as well. Additionally,
rigidities in the labour market, such as high unemployment beneﬁts, increase
wages and hinder R&D investments, employment and output.
Comparing our results with these of other papers, we believe that our ﬁnd-
ings contribute to the literature because we reveal the critical role of the inter-
action between the level where wages are set and the R&D spillovers. According
to R&D investments, Ulph and Ulph (1994, 1998) argue that underinvestment
due to unions can be overturned under bargaining over wages and employment
(Eﬃcient Bargaining). However it is well established that Eﬃcient Bargaining is
rarely observed in ﬁrms’ practice (see Booth, 1995, p.128) and additionally, they
examine the case of ﬁrm-level unions solely. Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre
(2002), show that ﬁrms overcome underinvestment under a central union only
if the market size is small. In our case, it is the coexistence of the central
union’s pressure and weak free-riding that help ﬁrms to overcome underinvest-
ment. Finally, Haucap and Wey (2004), in a tournament R&D setting, focus on
innovation incentives without examining ﬁrms’ R&D investment levels. Another
contribution to the relevant literature it that we carry out a detailed analysis for
the eﬀects on investments, wages, employment and output caused by rigidities
in the labour market, a crucial issue for the European economy.
5 Firms’ incentives for R&D cooperation
In this section we investigate ﬁrms’ strategies in the ﬁrst stage of the game. We
consider that R&D cooperation is allowed and we examine whether ﬁrms have
14 
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incentives to cooperate, for every level of wage-setting. Firm i h a si n c e n t i v e st o
cooperate in R&D with ﬁrm j if each ﬁrm’s proﬁts under the RJV are higher
than proﬁts under non-cooperative investments. Thus, we answer the second
question addressed in the introduction of this paper.
We begin our analysis with the case where wages are set at the level of
ﬁrms. Firm i’s proﬁts under non-cooperative R&D are given by ΠD
inc,e q .( 9 )
and under a RJV by ΠD
ic, eq. (24). We ﬁnd that ΠD
ic > ΠD
inc,a l w a y sh o l d s
(ﬁgure 3a). Given that R&D cooperation is proﬁtable, ﬁrms have incentives
to form a RJV. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that a RJV improves R&D investments
(ﬁgure 3b), wages, employment and output, if internalized spillovers exceed the
critical rate δD =0 .29.
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We now consider the case of a uniform wage determined at the level of in-
15dustry. In the same lines, given that ﬁrm i’s proﬁts under a RJV are always
higher (ΠC
ic > ΠC
inc, ﬁgure 4a) ﬁrms will form a RJV. Moreover, R&D invest-
ments (ﬁgure 4b), wages, employment and output are higher under cooperative
R&D investments, if internalized spillovers exceed the critical rate δC =0 .72.
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According to ﬁrms incentives to form a RJV and its subsequent eﬀects, we
summarize our results in the next proposition:
Proposition 3 (i) Firms have incentives to form a Research Joint Venture
for cost reducing process innovations, regardless the institutional level of wage-
setting. (ii) The eﬀects of a Research Joint Venture on investments, wages,
employment and output depend on the level of wage-setting.
We proved that ﬁrms have incentives to form a RJV, regardless the level
where wages are set. Intuitively, in case of non-cooperation, ﬁrms’ competition
in R&D and unions’ rent-extracting behaviour may discourage ﬁrms to invest
in R&D. On the contrary, by forming a RJV, ﬁrms act as a cartel in the R&D
stage, they internalize spillovers and in turn, investments, employment, wages,
output and proﬁts increase sequenti.
We showed that a RJV, compared with non-cooperation, performs better in
terms of R&D investments, wages, employment and output, whenever internal-
ized spillovers exceed a critical rate. Our innovative argument is that the criti-
cal spillover rate is inﬂuenced by the level where wages are set. The minimum
spillovers, that must be internalized, increase from δD =0 .29 to δC =0 .72,a sw e
move from ﬁrm-level wage bargaining to a uniform wage determined at the level
of industry.20 Our analysis indicates that a central union deters investments,
employment, wages and output increases, due to its stronger rent-extracting
and its more intense ‘rationally myopic’ behaviour (Hirsch, 2004), compared
20Consider an industry with δ =0 .4. A RJV leads to investment, employment and wage
and output increase, only if wages are set at the level of ﬁrms.
16with ﬁrm-level unions. Therefore, we argue that a central union hinders dra-
matically the diﬀusion of the eﬃciency created by a RJV to consumers and
employees.21 The reason for that lays on the comparative shift of investments
and the subsequent point of intersection of the R&D investment curves. If ﬁrms
invest non-cooperatively, as spillovers increase, the decreasing rate of invest-










. Under a RJV, as spillovers increase,
the increasing rate of investment under ﬁrm-level wage-setting exceeds the cor-
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By proving that ﬁrms have incentives to form a RJV always, what is more
interesting is to compare their incentives under diﬀerent levels of unionisation.
For the case of ﬁrm-level unions, incentives for a RJV are given by MD = ΠD
ic−
ΠD
inc, while in case of a central union, incentives are given by MC = ΠC
ic− ΠC
inc.
Diagrammatically, M is the area between Πic and Πinc,i nﬁgures 3a and 4a.
Comparing MD and MC, we conclude on the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Firms have stronger (weaker) incentives to form a Research
Joint Venture, whenever they face an industry union (ﬁrm-level unions), if
spillovers are low (δ<0.55), [high (δ>0.55)].
In ﬁgure 5 we plot MD and MC. Although a RJV is proﬁt-enhancing
for ﬁrms, regardless the level where wages are set, it does not always lead to
wage-increases for employees. Or else, although a RJV is proﬁt-enhancing for
ﬁrms, it has not always the same eﬃciency as a mechanism to overcome rent-
extracting. Whenever internalized spillovers are low (δ<0.55),aR J Vl e a d st o






,i fδ>0.29, while it never
leads to wage-increase under one industry union. Thus, a RJV helps ﬁrms to
overcome the rent-extracting exercised by two ﬁrm-level unions only if δ<0.29,
while it always helps ﬁrms to overcome the corresponding by one industry union,
as wC
c <w C
nc. The rent-extracting of a central union has been weakened more
than the corresponding by two ﬁrm-level unions and incentives for a RJV are
higher when ﬁrms face a central union
¡
MC >M D¢
. On the contrary, whenever
internalized spillovers are high (δ>0.55), a RJV always leads to wage-increases
in case of ﬁrm-level unions, while it leads to wage-increases under a central
union, only if δ>0.72.I nt h i sc a s e ,ﬁrms’ proﬁts increase through the RJV but
employees capture higher rents too. Therefore, the RJV is mainly a mechanism
that leads to wage-increases for employees, rather than a mechanism for ﬁrms
to overcome rent-extracting and the incentives for a RJV are lower when ﬁrms
face a central union
¡
MC <M D¢




21This argument can be crucial for policy suggestions, for the case of the European Union,
given that although national and EU level R&D policies encourage RJVs consistently, cen-
tralised wage negotiations remain familiar in less R&D intensive countries (e.g. Spain and
Greece) hindering their ’catch-up’.
17δ =0 .55. In general, we prove that whenever spillovers are low (δ<0.55),aR J V
as a mechanism to overcome rent-extracting, operates more eﬃciently in case of
an industry union, than for ﬁrm-level unions and incentives for cooperation are
stronger for ﬁrms in industries with centralised systems of wage-setting.
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6E x t e n s i o n s
Our basic model is rather stylized, so it is natural to check the robustness of our
results. Therefore, we need to explain how results may change when we extend
our basic model in two diﬀerent directions.
6.1 Bertrand competition22
The question addressed in this subsection is whether results demonstrated under
Cournot competition, hold under price competition as well. We consider the case
of two ﬁrms selling diﬀerentiated products. The timing of the game remains
unchanged, except that in the last stage of the game, ﬁrms maximize their
proﬁts with respect to prices. The corresponding proﬁtf u n c t i o nf o rﬁrm i,h a s
the form:
Πi (Pi,P j,w i,x i,x j,δ,θ)=[ Pi− (wi + c − xi − δxj)] ×




22Due to space limits, we brieﬂyp r e s e n to u rm a i nﬁndings. A detailed derivation of the
r e s u l t si sa v a i l a b l ef r o mt h ea u t h o r su p o nr e q u e s t .
18It can be shown that results obtained in sections 3, 4 and 5, hold for the
case of Bertrand competition as well. The reason is that while the nature of
product market competition is altered, competition in prices does not alter the
interactions between ﬁrms and unions that drive the results.
6.2 The general Right to Manage model
In the basic model, we assumed that unions unilaterally set the wages, while
ﬁrms set employment and production levels. Therefore, we formalized rent-
extracting in terms of institutional levels of bargaining. It is then natural to
check whether our results still hold if we apply the general Right-to-Manage
model, where ﬁrms do have bargaining power over wages. By doing so, we
model unions’ rent extracting both in terms of institutional levels of bargaining
and in terms of distribution of bargaining power between ﬁrms and unions.
This is an innovative modelling of unions’ rent-extracting in the literature for
the relationship between unionisation and innovative activity. In this literature,
the rent-extracting of unions has been formalized either by the distribution
of bargaining power between ﬁrms and ﬁrm-level unions, without examining
diﬀerent levels where bargaining over wage takes place (Ulph and Ulph, 1994,
1998; Tauman and Weiss, 1987), or by the institutional level where wages are set,
without taking into account the distribution of bargaining power between ﬁrms
and unions (Haucap and Wey, 2004; Calabuig and Gonzalez-Maestre, 2002).
In our case, if bargaining over wage takes place at the level of ﬁrms, we con-
sider two ﬁrm-level unions endowed with the same bargaining power (β1 = β2 = βD)
and the general symmetric Nash bargain over wages, between union-ﬁrm pair i
solves:









wher β is the union’s Nash bargaining power and 0 ≤ β ≤ 1.23
We ﬁnd that if unions have no bargaining power (βD =0 ) , the critical
spillover rate is δD =0 .5, while in case of ﬁrm-level monopoly unions (βD =1 ) ,
δD =0 .29. In case of a centralised system of bargaining, one industry union
(with bargaining power βC), bargains with industry’s federation over a uniform
wage. The federation acts so as to maximize overall industry’s proﬁts.24 In a
perfectly competitive labour market δC =0 .5, and whenever a central union
unilaterally sets the wage, δC =0 .72. The critical spillover rate decreases from
δC =0 .72 to δC =0 .5, as central unions’ bargaining power decreases and labour
market becomes more competitive.
As far as our results obtained under monopoly unions, remain qualitative
robust under the general Right to Manage model, we show that it is mainly the
institutional level of wage-setting, rather than the distribution of bargaining
23Disagreement payoﬀs are assumed to be zero and w0 for ﬁrms union(s) respectively.
24T h ec a s eo fﬁrm-level bargaining over wages was analytically solved, while results for the
case of bargaining between a central union and the federation were obtained after numerical
simulations. A detailed ﬁle is available from the authors upon request.
19power between ﬁrms and unions, that drives the results. This is an innovative
argument too, given that, in the relevant literature the unions’ rent extracting
is ex ante modelled either in terms of bargaining power distribution with ﬁrm-
level unions or in terms of diﬀerent unionisation levels. We contribute to the
relevant literature as far as examine the combination of the above points of view
and we conclude that it is the level where wages are set that mainly drives the
results.25
7W e l f a r e a n a l y s i s
In this section we analyze how the organizational form and the externalities
of R&D investments jointly with the level of wage-setting aﬀect social welfare.
In the literature for unions’ eﬀects on ﬁrms’ R&D investments, this is the ﬁrst
time that a detailed welfare analysis is carried out and thus, we believe that
our policy suggestions are more robust. We focus exclusively on the Cournot
competition and we consider that there exists a regulator who can approve the
formation of a RJV if it enhances social welfare.
The appropriate measure of welfare consists of three parts: consumers’ sur-



















¢2indicates consumers’ surplus, 2ΠB
A indicates overall industry proﬁts
and 2wB
ALB
A indicates overall unions’ utility.
We have two alternative organizational forms of R&D activities (ﬁrms do not
cooperate: nc, ﬁrms cooperate: c) and workers are organized either in ﬁrm-level
unions (D) or in a central union (C). According to the social welfare (SW),
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25We have only investigated the case of Cournot competition, but we believe that our results
will be valid in case of Bertrand competition as well.
20We ﬁnd that SWD
nc >S W C
nc and SWD
c >S W C
c always hold, for the case
of non-cooperative and cooperative R&D, respectively. Therefore, we ﬁnd that
a centralised system of wage-setting leads to a consistent depression in social
welfare, for both organizational forms of R&D investments. The intuition be-
hind this result is quite simple: social welfare is the sum of consumers’ surplus,
ﬁrms’ proﬁts and employees’ utility. Firms’ proﬁts and consumers’ surplus are
always higher under a decentralised system of wage-setting. In contrast, em-
ployees’ utility is always higher under a centralised system of wage-setting. But,
the sum of ﬁrms’ proﬁts and consumers’ surplus overcomes the central union’s
depression in social welfare. Results are presented diagrammatically in ﬁgure
6.
We now turn to the core issue of the social welfare analysis. Should the
regulator approve the RJV formation? In order to answer this question, we
compare, for every level of wage-setting, social welfare under strategic R&D
investments with welfare in case of a RJV and we summarize our ﬁndings in the
following proposition:
Proposition 5 Under a decentralised (centralised) system of wage-setting, the
regulator should approve the Research Joint Venture formation if the spillover
rate is δD > 0.29 (δC > 0.72).
The economic rationale behind this result lays in the analysis carried out
in section 5, where we proved that a central union deters the diﬀusion of the
eﬃciency created by a RJV to consumers and employees. Formally speaking,
ﬁrms’ proﬁts are always higher under cooperative R&D investments, but unions’
utility and consumers’ surplus are higher only if δD > 0.29 (δC > 0.72) under
a decentralised system of wage-setting (a centralised system), compared with
non-cooperative R&D investments. We present our results in ﬁgure 6.
 




















Figure 6: Social welfare under strategic and cooperative R&D investments, in
case of ﬁrm-level and industry-wide wages.
We show that the level where wages are set should aﬀect regulators’ decisions
according to the approval of a RJV. Our analysis also reveals that although a
21R J Vi sa l w a y sp r o ﬁtable for ﬁrms, it is not always preferable for regulators. In
industries with ﬁrm-level wage-setting, ﬁrms’ and regulators’ preferences will
be aligned if internalized spillovers exceed δ>0.29, while the corresponding
threshold for industries with a uniform wage is at δ>0.72. This result under-
lines the diﬃculties for the alignment between ﬁrms’ and regulators’ preferences,
caused by a centralised system of bargaining. This approach for the distortion
in social welfare by industry unions, is also innovative in the literature.
Based on the above analysis, some directions for policy implications come
directly. First of all, taking as a fact the depressing eﬀects of a central union on
social welfare, our ﬁrst policy implication indicates that policy-makers should
extend the antitrust rules to labour markets and move towards the decentrali-
sation of wage bargaining in R&D intensive industries.26 It is easily observable
in ﬁgure 6 that the decentralisation of wage bargaining leads to enhanced social
welfare in cases of non-cooperative and cooperative R&D investments. Addi-
tionally, we have already assumed that the unemployment beneﬁt w0,s e tb y
the regulator, can be an instrument for labour market policy and so far analysis
has showed that unemployment beneﬁts strengthen unions’ rent-extracting po-
tential and deter investments and employment increases. Therefore, we further
suggest the decrease of the unemployment beneﬁts in R&D intensive industries,
in order to increase investments and employment.
Our policy-mix also contains the encouragement of RJVs, as far as the it
is the combination of the above labour market policies together with the for-
mation of RJVs, that leads to enhanced social welfare, given that a minimum
rate of spillovers (δ>0.29) are internalized. Through our integrated policy-
mix, policy-makers can overturn not only rent-extracting (through decentral-
ising wage bargaining) but also free-riding (through encouraging RJVs), and
this is not only a novel aspect in the relevant literature, but also a straight-
forward applicable policy. Especially for the case of European Union, given
the wide centralisation of wage-bargaining between ﬁrms and unions and the
asymmetries across Member States R&D policies as well, we suggest that the
above policy-mix can be an eﬀective framework for integrated labour markets
and R&D policies which will suﬃciently increase European competitiveness.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper contributes to the literature for the relationship between unionisation
and innovative activity. We incorporated R&D spillovers and the RJV potential
and we proved that the eﬀect of the level of unionisation on R&D investments
depends on whether spillovers are internalized or lead to free-riding, a result
that goes against the conventional argument for the negative eﬀects of unions
per se. We further proved that although an industry union may strengthen
26In line with Haucap and Wey (2004), the extension of antitrust rules to labour markets
would mean that the formation of industry unions and collective wage agreements should not
be allowed due to their monopolisation eﬀects. However, although in Haucap and Wey (2004),
this suggestion is rather intuitive, we prove its necessity.
22ﬁrms’ incentives to form a RJV, rigidities in the labour market, such as an
industry and/or high unemployment beneﬁts, hinder employment and output.
We also found that a central union’s ‘rationally myopic’ behaviour deters the
diﬀusion of the eﬃciency created by a RJV to consumers and employees and
hinders the alignment between ﬁrms’ and regulators’ preferences according to
the formation of a RJV. Therefore, we suggest that extending antitrust rules to
labour markets, reducing unemployment beneﬁts and encouraging RJVs, can be
an integrated framework to improve both market performance and consumers
surplus as well.
Finally, we hope that our results could guide future empirical research on
the “R&D investments in unionised industries” literature, given the inconclu-
sive received empirical results. We suggest that an empirical test should begin
with a detailed study for the discrimination in the data material between in-
dustries with ﬁrm- and central-level unions, low and high R&D spillovers, RJVs
and non-cooperative forms of R&D investments. For industries with low R&D
spillovers and non-cooperative forms of R&D investments, if one combines R&D
investments under industry unions with investments under ﬁrm-level unions, one
might ﬁnd that in the former case investments are higher. In contrast, for in-
dustries with cooperative forms of R&D investments, one might ﬁnd opposite
results.
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